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Double Heuristics and Collective 
Knowledge: the Case of Expertise 
 
Stephen Turner 
 
 
 
There is a burgeoning literature on social epistemology. Some of it purports to 
illuminate the problem of expert knowledge. Much of this literature applies 
epistemological theories, such as reliabilism, to expert claims, which are 
interpreted in terms of notions familiar to epistemology, such as testimony. 
Another body of literature is concerned with the contrast between individual 
and collective rationality or collective knowledge, and is concerned with issues 
of emergence, specifically with the claim that collective knowledge processes 
are different from and arrive at different and better results than individual 
knowledge acquisition. Many of these are discussions of collective rationality, 
and use formal methods. To do so, they typically simplify the issues by 
assuming independent individual judges. Independence implies epistemic 
independence, meaning that people act on their own knowledge. Discussions 
of the related problem of expertise typically follow the same pattern: expertise 
is compared to testimony, which the individual judges as reliable. The classic 
prisoner’s dilemma is based explicitly on the mutual ignorance of the prisoners 
with respect to intentions. Both the social relations between the prisoners and 
the possibility of sharing knowledge are defined away. In this respect, these 
approaches follow standard economic theories, which assume information 
equality or otherwise assume the irrelevance of differences in quality of 
information between market participants in market transactions. Nor is there 
an easy alternative to these assumptions. Asymmetric information theorizing, 
for example, is technically difficult even in small scale transactions with limited 
dimensions of relevant information, such as theorizing the issues of agency in a 
used car purchase. Expanding these considerations and expanding 
considerations of variations between market participants makes calculating 
outcomes intractable.   
 My concern in what follows will be with cases of extreme “information 
asymmetry” in which members of the audience of the experts have knowledge 
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that is different from the knowledge of experts. The knowledge is often 
relevant, and the decision by a member of the audience of the expert to accept 
or reject the expert’s claims is not, as the models imply, based simply on beliefs 
about the reliability of the experts, but on the knowledge that the member of 
the audience already has, and has solid grounds for. In these cases, the better 
model for understanding how the member of the audience assesses the expert 
involves the content of the knowledge, not merely the evaluation of the expert. 
The member of the audience makes an epistemic judgment on the primary 
knowledge material, not merely on the credentials of the expert. My concern in 
this paper will be to provide a way of thinking about these epistemic 
judgments. But this discussion will be mostly illustrative.  
My primary aim will be to suggest a way of thinking about the 
aggregation of these judgments and how this aggregation can be understood. In 
the course of this I will treat the problem of expert knowledge as a special case 
of knowledge aggregation. My suggestion will be that the application of specific 
decision procedures, such as voting, produces, at the collective level, an 
emergent form of knowledge acquisition with its own features. Nothing about 
this account, however, requires an appeal to super-individual entities or 
processes, collective intentionality, and so forth. My point, rather, will be that 
to understand these processes it is necessary to eliminate some familiar 
prejudices about knowledge acquisition and our dependence on others. To put 
it in a slogan, my point is that “collective epistemology” or social epistemology 
has failed to be either sufficiently social or sufficiently epistemological. My 
approach will be to bring both back in, without resorting to appeals to 
collective facts.  
 
The Background 
 
Social epistemologists have long been concerned with cases in which 
collective decisions, through such means as judges voting on verdicts, differ 
from individual judgments. Philip Pettit formulates two of the standard 
assumptions of these cases as follows:  
 
$ you are amongst many people who face a certain question; 
$ you are all equally intelligent, equally informed, and equally impartial. 
(2006a: 179)   
 
In normal social situations, neither of Pettit’s assumptions holds, and in expert 
situations the exact opposite is assumed: that people who know something you 
don’t are more intelligent, and may have fewer biases. Moreover, they claim to 
understand the question better than you do, a second-order claim with unusual 
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epistemic properties: among other things, it undermines the usual ways of 
judging the claims of others as one understands them.  
 Pettit interprets the epistemic issues which arise when one’s own opinion 
differs from the majority opinion as a normative problem: when should one 
defer to majority testimony and when should one not do so? To answer this, he 
adds to his standard assumptions about equal knowledge and the like   
 
$ you, however, differ from most others in the answer you give; 
$ you are aware that these things [i.e. the full set of prior assumptions 
about equal intelligence, knowledge, and impartiality] are true. (2006a: 
179) 
 
If we begin with the question of how we would ever know that the people you 
are among “are all equally intelligent, equally informed, and equally impartial,” 
we can see that these models are epistemically problematic. In this case, the 
problem of expert knowledge is excluded by definition: expert knowledge is 
precisely that case in which equality in intelligence, knowledge, and impartiality 
are denied by both the expert claiming expertise and the member of the 
expert’s audience assessing it. So any direct application of these assumptions to 
the notion of expert knowledge will fail. They could apply only if the problem 
of expert knowledge is reduced to the problem of assessing expert “testimony,” 
so that the question of when to defer to an expert becomes a problem of when 
to defer to majority opinion about the expert. As noted earlier, this way of 
understanding assent to expert claims strips the knowledge claims themselves 
of content, making the knowledge of the content possessed by the members of 
the audience irrelevant.   
 Another approach to the problem of aggregation involves the suspicion 
of systematic bias in the production of expert knowledge claims. Miriam 
Solomon has in mind the idea that gender biases and the like distort theory 
choice. Although this approach was originally motivated by feminist 
considerations, it applies more generally. Solomon constructs this as a problem 
of epistemic diversity, and, rather than dealing with expert authority, deals with 
the problem of theory choice in the scientific community as a model for 
epistemic decision-making generally. She suggests that what is needed is a 
means of eliminating the effects of biases by balancing biases against one 
another and demanding empirical support for all options (2006a: 37-8; cf. 
2006b). This differs slightly from Pettit’s approach, by assuming that despite 
being equally impartial, people have biases. But it also takes a valuable step in 
epistemologizing the problem of aggregation. “Theory choice by a community” 
is a collective procedure, although it is a theoretical construction of the 
observer rather than something that scientists collectively perform, as in voting. 
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And the term “biases” does provide some, very minimal, epistemic content to 
the notion of epistemic diversity. But this is too small a step. The problem of 
bias is dwarfed by a much bigger problem of epistemic diversity: that we know 
different things and can understand different things.  
 
Double Heuristics 
  
The Pettit assumptions are simply false. The true, but difficult, situation 
is this. We know something already, about experts and what makes them 
acceptable, and also often about the content of their claims. Our knowledge is 
not “equal” to that of others, or the same as others. We have our own 
experiences and practical and sometimes theoretical knowledge that either fits 
or fails to fit with the expert claims. The (descriptive rather than normative) 
epistemological problem is to understand this kind of knowledge and to 
understand how we rely on our knowledge of others—the social aspect—and 
how we use our own knowledge to assimilate it to what others know.  
 The literature in social epistemology has been dominated by technical 
solutions. But if one adds actual epistemology to the social, by considering how 
we use the content of the knowledge of others as distinct from simply 
accepting on trust, these solutions become unstable. A less technical, but more 
usable way of conceptualizing the problem would be this: to think of our use of 
the knowledge of others as governed by more or less standard heuristics, which 
may go wrong in abnormal situations, and thus have biases. To discuss this 
problem, however, one needs some sort of model. The image of the individual 
knower I propose to work with is itself a simplification, as it must be. But it is a 
simplification that allows for a discussion, however limited itself, of the general 
problem of knowledge aggregation. The model is this: the individual is limited, 
operates with complexity reducing epistemic strategies, arrives at knowledge, 
and makes knowledge judgments. The individual knower, in short, uses 
heuristics, which, like all heuristics, work in some situations and not others. 
They have biases and blind spots. This is hardly an innovative idea, of course. 
It is enshrined in the literature on empirical models of rational choice (Tversky 
and Kahneman 1974, 1981). 
The value of this starting point is this: it provides us with a model for 
thinking of emergent and “collective” forms of the same thing. We can think of 
decision procedures, such as democracies, and aggregation mechanisms without 
collective decisions but with “collective” outcomes, such as markets, as 
themselves being heuristics. We can think of procedures which function as if 
they were decision procedures, such as market decisions that put firms into 
bankruptcy, as heuristics as well. The market itself is not a heuristic, nor is a 
rule like majority voting. But it is a procedure which makes selections. If a 
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procedure is understood as made up of people operating with particular 
heuristics that include heuristics about the knowledge of others and how to 
assimilate it, plus some sort of analogue to a decision, these emergent processes 
themselves can be understood to have normal situations in which they “work” 
and others in which their “biases”—biases being the source of the efficiency 
gained by heuristics—lead to bad results.   
 This notion of a “double heuristic” then allows us to conceptualize the 
issues that arise with, for example, the (now commonplace) claim that liberal 
democracy needs to be abolished to save the human race in the face of global 
warming. We can ask what sort of alternative collective heuristic there is, such 
as the heuristic of uncritical acceptance of the assertions of scientific experts, 
and what the biases of this heuristic might be; which is to say, to ask what the 
normal and abnormal situation is for this heuristic when it is understood as a 
heuristic made up of the aggregation of the heuristics of people judging experts 
with the biases of these heuristics, and of experts themselves making decisions 
with their biases.  
 Nevertheless, the contrast between individual and collective results is an 
important one, and can be generalized beyond voting examples. If we think of 
individual and collective procedures of dealing with questions, one thing is 
immediately obvious—collective “decisions,” whether it is “the market 
decides,” voting, or counting up the guesses about beans at the county fair, all 
happen differently than individual decisions. One makes up one’s mind about a 
bean-count, and decides to submit the estimate. The collective act of adding up 
the estimates and taking a mean takes place on a schedule. No “minds” are 
made up. The market makes pricing decisions continuously—buyers make 
them one at a time, sellers look at their stock and respond by changing prices. 
The collective result is a theoretical construction from the actual prices that are 
charged transaction by transaction. Juries deliberate and vote, in accordance 
with protocols and admonitions. Jurors decide they are persuaded when they 
reach an epistemic threshold of doubt that they individually determine by self-
examination, but the collective threshold is unanimity or some other rule.  
 
Putting Epistemology Back In 
 
The problem of experts in politics has epistemic content, but the content 
is highly problematic. Both the literature in what Alvin Goldman calls “classical 
social epistemology” and the literature of the Mertonian sociology of science 
have focused on the authority of science. As I have noted, epistemologists, not 
fond of the term “authority,” have construed the issue in terms of testimony. 
This allows authority to be interpreted in traditional philosophical terms, in this 
case in terms of reliability and therefore in terms of reliabilism, as an 
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epistemology. Other social epistemologists have focused on cases in which 
collective knowledge is “better” than individual knowledge, or at least different. 
The model in these cases is guesses at the number of beans in a jar at a country 
fair: the mean is closer to the correct number than the individual guesses.  
 What is striking about these cases is their tractability to formal reasoning. 
One can put up a matrix of judges’ votes, for example, and show that the 
collective result of the votes differs from individual votes (List and Pettit 2002). 
What is also striking is their inattention to content. Guesses about beans have 
little epistemic content. Moreover, one’s knowledge of the guesses of others is 
irrelevant or assumed to be irrelevant.  
 But actual cases of judgments of expert opinions in political contexts are 
far richer, in a number of ways. The citizen has a variety of epistemic resources, 
including beliefs about the world, experiences, grounds for making judgments 
about the sources of claims, and personal knowledge to bring to the making of 
beliefs about the subject matter discussed by experts and of the experts 
themselves.  
 The classic discussion of this is Brian Wynne’s paper “May the Sheep 
Safely Graze?” (1996) that considered the case of nuclear power experts 
making claims about the effect of radiation. The sheep owners to whom the 
expert discussion was addressed were skeptical of the claims, based on their 
knowledge of the actual grazing habits of the sheep. This is a case of two kinds 
of knowledge fitting together. But the fitting together involved content, and the 
product of the fitting together would alter what each side believed, rather than 
merely combining independent estimates to create a third without altering at 
least the epistemic weight of the beliefs of one side or the other.  
 Assuming content away, using the model of bias and similar devices, 
does not help much with these cases. Empirically, content-free judgments 
about expertise based on the pure kinds of assessments involved in testimony, 
in the extremely abnormal and purified sense of testimony in which the 
reliability of the witness is the only consideration, are nowhere to be found. 
When people on a jury assess real testimony, they do so on the basis of their 
prior knowledge and actual experience of the world, as lawyers know very well, 
which is why they are careful to select juries that are as ignorant as possible 
about the topics they are going to hear testimony on.  
 
A Classic Model of Science as a Collective Heuristic 
 
Philosophy of science provides some models for thinking about “fitting 
together,” such as Michael Polanyi’s picture of science as a big jigsaw puzzle 
into which we each fit our little pieces of knowledge. Polanyi provided more 
than one, and the differences between his accounts are revealing with respect 
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to the phenomenon of the relation between individual and collective heuristics. 
In the essays collected in The Logic of Liberty, he describes the collective process 
in terms of the  
 
adjustment of each scientist’s activities to the results hitherto achieved 
by others. In adjusting himself to the others each scientist acts 
independently, yet by virtue of these several adjustments scientists keep 
extending together with maximum efficiency the achievements of 
science as a whole. At each step a scientist will select from the results 
obtained by others those elements which he can use best for his own 
task and will thus make the best contribution to science; opening thereby 
the field for other scientists to make their optimum contribution in their 
turn– and so on indefinitely. ([1951] 1980: 34-35) 
 
This implies that what I am calling a heuristic—an efficient method for getting 
“collective” knowledge results from individual contributions to a process of 
aggregating knowledge.  
 
The only way to get the job finished quickly would be to get as many 
helpers as could conveniently work at one and the same set and let them 
loose on it, each to follow his own initiative. Each helper would then 
watch the situation as it was affected by the progress made by all the 
others and would set himself new problems in accordance with the latest 
outline of the completed part of the puzzle. The tasks undertaken by 
each would closely dovetail into those performed by the others. And 
consequently the joint efforts of all would form a closely organized 
whole, even though each helper would follow entirely his own 
independent judgment. ([1951] 1980: 35) 
 
A collective process is defined by its decision procedure, which in these early 
writings Polanyi described as a “twofold condition,” consisting of rapid 
publicity plus acclamation, in which  
 
. . . each suggested new step can be readily judged as to its correctness or 
otherwise, and that each new step is rapidly brought to the notice of all 
participants and taken into account by them when they make their own 
next move. ([1951] 1980: 36) 
 
Pure science, as distinct from applied science or technology, required this 
heuristic, rather than others.  
Polanyi was arguing against planned science, which represented a distinct 
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heuristic or set of possible heuristics. On the surface, planning seemed to be 
the perfect way to avoid waste in science and produce valuable results. A great 
deal of thinking, and a social movement of Left-wing scientists in Britain, 
promoted planning generally, and the planning of science specifically, in the 
1930s, as part of a general enthusiasm for the idea of planning. Polanyi’s 
argument against planning had to do with the problem of knowledge.  
 
Put negatively, planning is simply impracticable, at least for the most 
important problems in science: No committee of scientists, however 
distinguished, could forecast the further progress of science except for 
the routine extension of the existing system . . . the points at which the 
existing system can be effectively amended reveal themselves only to the 
individual investigator. And even he can discover only through a lifelong 
concentration on one particular aspect of science a small number of 
practicable and worthwhile problems. ([1951] 1980: 89) 
 
The argument against planned science then depends on an argument about the 
distribution of knowledge. Translated into our terms, the argument is this: 
knowledge in science is specialized, so a heuristic that depends on the 
knowledge of some small group or any collective decision-making process will 
lose the advantages that the specialist has in deciding how to pursue his or her 
own problems.  
But science cannot avoid collective decision procedures. Money has to 
be doled out. In this respect it is necessary to construct another decision 
procedure. Here, notoriously, Polanyi and his sympathizers found the going 
more difficult. The process of doling out determines the content of the science 
that can be extended. So there is no escaping the consequences of the system 
of supporting science. The best that can be done is to have a system that 
retains the advantages of the heuristic described above.   
 
The pursuit of science can be organized . . . in no other manner than by 
granting complete independence to all mature scientists. They will then 
distribute themselves over the whole field of possible discoveries, each 
applying his own special ability to the task that appears most profitable 
to him. Thus as many trails as possible will be covered, and science will 
penetrate most rapidly in every direction towards that kind of hidden 
knowledge which is unsuspected by all but its discoverer; the kind of 
knowledge on which the progress of science truly depends. The function 
of public authorities is not to plan research, but only to provide 
opportunities for its pursuit. All that they have to do is provide facilities 
for every good scientist to follow his own interests in science. ([1951] 
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1980: 89-90)  
 
With this general heuristic in mind, one can turn to problems of institutional 
design. This is the model that the Howard Hughes Medical Institute applies by 
giving six-year appointments on a principle of scientific promise with no 
restrictions on what the scientist will choose to do. The American National 
Science Foundation does this by evaluating proposals on merit by specialized 
panels. In each case, of course, many choices need to be made, each of which 
involves biases, biases which diminish the odds of science penetrating in some 
of the directions where hidden knowledge can be revealed.  
 The epistemology involved here is still individualistic: the discoverer 
seeks hidden knowledge individually. Verification is collective, by acclamation. 
Both of these are of course caricatures of the actual practice of science. But 
there is already a hint in these early writings of the problems of fitting 
knowledge together, which Polanyi later makes more central, in the idea of 
extension and the admission that specialization of a very extreme kind is 
characteristic of scientists. What disqualifies these scientists from making the 
kinds of general judgments about how science should be planned is this very 
specialization, and this also disqualifies them for the role of acclaiming 
scientific achievements. In some of his early writings, Polanyi spoke of the 
decision-makers in science as a group analogous to Plato’s Guardians. But the 
Guardians were, so to speak, possessors of the most general knowledge; 
scientists, in contrast, are specialists. These were conflicts that he later resolved, 
in his classic essay “The Republic of Science” (1962).  
 The resolution is of interest not only because of its explicit appeal to the 
concept of spontaneous coordination, but because of the new kind of 
knowledge relation he identified as the connecting link between the specialized 
worlds of science. The new emphasis is especially relevant to “social 
epistemology,” because Polanyi makes an explicit contrast between activities 
which are “coordinated” and those that are not. The examples favored by Pettit 
and Solomon are uncoordinated—the judges rendering verdicts, people 
guessing locations of submarines or numbers of beans in a jar are independent 
and take no account of the knowledge that others have. In science, Polanyi 
says, the result of this would be as follows:  
 
Each scientist would go on for a while developing problems derived 
from the information initially available to all. But these problems would 
soon be exhausted, and in the absence of further information about the 
results achieved by others, new problems of any value would cease to 
arise and scientific progress would come to a standstill. (1962: 54) 
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This is enough to show that science is a coordinated activity, “and it also 
reveals the principle of their coordination. This consists in the adjustment of 
the efforts of each to the hitherto achieved results of the others. We may call 
this a coordination by mutual adjustment of independent initiatives—of 
initiatives which are coordinated because each takes into account all the other 
initiatives operating within the same system” (1962: 54). The emphasis on 
coordination is new. And one soon sees why, when he considers the analogue 
to a decision procedure in science.  
 When he turns to the problem of explaining the way in which 
coordination works, he reasons in terms of what I have called here double 
heuristics. He introduces the image of the puzzle: “Imagine that we are given 
the pieces of a very large jig-saw puzzle, and suppose that for some reason it is 
important that our giant puzzle be put together in the shortest possible time” 
(1962: 55). He gives three examples of increasingly effective methods of doing 
this with a group of helpers. The first is independence, in which each person is 
given a few pieces to fit together: “Suppose we share out the pieces of the jig-
saw puzzle equally among the helpers and let each of them work on his lot 
separately” (1962: 55).  He remarks “it is easy to see that this method, which 
would be quite appropriate to a number of women shelling peas, would be 
totally ineffectual in this case, since few of the pieces allocated to one particular 
assistant would be found to fit together” (1962: 55). The second would be to 
supply each with copies of all the pieces, but still make them work 
independently: “We could do a little better by providing duplicates of all the 
pieces to each helper separately, and eventually somehow bring together their 
several results” (1962: 55). Polanyi’s verdict is that “even by this method the 
team would not much surpass the performance of a single individual at his 
best” (1962: 55).  
The best collective heuristic would be this, which Polanyi takes to be a 
model of the coordination heuristic for science itself: 
 
The only way the assistants can effectively cooperate and surpass by far 
what any single one of them could do, is to let them work on putting the 
puzzle together in sight of the others, so that every time a piece of it is 
fitted in by one helper, all the others will immediately watch out for the 
next step that becomes possible in consequence. Under this system, each 
helper will act on his own initiative, by responding to the latest 
achievements of the others, and the completion of their joint task will be 
greatly accelerated. (1962: 55)  
 
He goes on to note that “Such self-coordination of independent initiatives 
leads to a joint result 
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which is unpremeditated by any of those who bring it about. Their 
coordination is guided as by an invisible hand towards the joint discovery of a 
hidden system of things. Since its end-result is unknown, this kind of 
cooperation can only advance stepwise, and the total performance will be the 
best possible if each consecutive step is decided upon by the person most 
competent to do so” (1962: 55). He expands the thought with this image: “We 
may imagine this condition to be fulfilled for the fitting together of a jig-saw 
puzzle if each helper watches out for any new opportunities arising along a 
particular section of the hitherto completed patch of the puzzle, and also keeps 
an eye on a particular lot of pieces, so as to fit them in wherever a chance 
presents itself” (1962: 55). The “competence” in question is epistemic and 
localized. The person knows more about this little patch. But in the later text 
Polanyi admits that this has implications for the acceptance and evaluation of 
science.  
 From the point of view of discovery, the argument is the same. The 
result is a heuristic that is more effective than the others, at least with respect to 
speed. “The effectiveness of a group of helpers will then exceed that of any 
isolated member, to the extent to which some member of the group will always 
discover a new chance for adding a piece to the puzzle more quickly than any 
one isolated person could have done by himself” (1962: 55). The term invisible 
hand invites comparison to markets, and Polanyi suggests that the comparison 
is apt, but the conclusion should not be that science is a special case of 
markets, but that “the coordinating functions of the market are but a special 
case of coordination by mutual adjustment” (1962: 66).  This notion of mutual 
adjustment, however, is a new emphasis. The contrast to the market is this:  
 
In the case of science, adjustment takes place by taking note of the 
published results of other scientists; while in the case of the market, 
mutual adjustment is mediated by a system of prices broadcasting 
current exchange relations, which make supply meet demand. But the 
system of prices ruling the market not only transmits information in the 
light of which economic agents can mutually adjust their actions; it also 
provides them with an incentive to exercise economy in terms of money. 
(1962: 56)  
 
The motivations in science differ: “by contrast, the scientist responding directly 
to the intellectual situation created by the published results of other scientists is 
motivated by current professional standards” (1962: 56). Current professional 
standards, as we will see, play a special role. The choices about what lines of 
inquiry to follow that the scientist makes in the face of these standards, Polanyi 
admits, have an economic character. The scientist does not want to waste time 
                    DOUBLE HEURISTICS AND COLLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE         75 
 
on insoluble problems, or those which are too easy, or hypotheses that are 
implausible from the standpoint of present professional knowledge. But 
originality is prized by these professional standards.  
The puzzle, from the point of view of the application of collective 
heuristics, is in the decision procedure, meaning in this case understanding how 
these standards are applied. As noted, Polanyi earlier seemed to rely on a kind 
of general acclamation. Now he recognizes the conflict between specialization 
and the idea that each scientist is omnicompetent to act as judge.  
 
No single scientist has a sound understanding of more than a tiny 
fraction of the total domain of science. How can an aggregate of such 
specialists possibly form a joint opinion? How can they possibly exercise 
jointly the delicate function of imposing a current scientific view about 
the nature of things, and the current scientific valuation of proposed 
contributions, even while encouraging an originality which would modify 
this orthodoxy? (1962: 59) 
 
The solution to this is of course to invoke a new collective heuristic, or what 
Polanyi calls an “organizational principle.”  
 
In seeking the answer to this question we shall discover yet another 
organisational principle that is essential for the control of a multitude of 
independent scientific initiatives. This principle is based on the fact that, 
while scientists can admittedly exercise competent judgment only over a 
small part of science, they can usually judge an area adjoining their own 
special studies that is broad enough to include some fields on which 
other scientists have specialised. We thus have a considerable degree of 
overlapping between the areas over which a scientist can exercise a 
sound, critical judgment. And, of course, each scientist who is a member 
of a group of overlapping competences will also be a member of other 
groups of the same kind, so that the whole of science will be covered by 
chains and networks of overlapping neighbourhoods. Each link in these 
chains and networks will establish agreement between the valuations 
made by scientists overlooking the same overlapping fields, and so, from 
one overlapping neighbourhood to the other, agreement will be 
established on the valuation of scientific merit throughout all the 
domains of science. (1962: 59) 
 
Crudely, there are scientists in adjacent areas of science who know enough to 
judge the work of the specialist, and this enforces consistency in the application 
of professional standards.  
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 These relations of adjacency produce a network, which is the point at 
which we can interpret this as a collective heuristic. Polanyi puts this in his own 
terms: 
 
This network is the seat of scientific opinion. Scientific opinion is an 
opinion not held by any single human mind, but one which, split into 
thousands of fragments, is held by a multitude of individuals, each of 
whom endorses the other's opinion at second hand, by relying on the 
consensual chains which link him to all the others through a sequence of 
overlapping neighborhoods. (1962: 59-60) 
 
But scientific opinion, even when it is distributed in this way (and Polanyi has 
more to say about whose opinions count most) is still opinion, as Polanyi 
always insisted. These procedures, and the collective heuristics system they 
create through their operation, are not epistemic guarantors of truth.  
 In his earlier writings Polanyi discussed the corruption of scientific 
opinion. In “The Republic of Science” he concedes that the system of control 
by the application of professional standards can lead to bad results. But on a 
collective level, it is, in our terms, the best heuristic.    
 
scientific opinion may, of course, sometimes be mistaken, and as a result 
unorthodox work of high originality and merit may be discouraged or 
altogether suppressed for a time. But these risks have to be taken. Only 
the discipline imposed by an effective scientific opinion can prevent the 
adulteration of science by cranks and dabblers. In parts of the world 
where no sound and authoritative scientific opinion is established 
research stagnates for lack of stimulus, while unsound reputations grow 
up based on commonplace achievements or mere empty boasts. Politics 
and business play havoc with appointments and the granting of subsidies 
for research; journals are made unreadable by including much trash. 
(1962: 61) 
 
However, “Though it is easy to find flaws in [the] operation [of the 
organizational principles of this system], they yet remain the only principles by 
which this vast domain of collective creativity can be effectively promoted and 
coordinated” (1962: 61). 
 Evaluating these claims is not my concern here. This is an illustration of 
the basic concept of double heuristics. But a few points need to be made. 
Polanyi changes his ideas about the nature of the relations between areas of 
science in “The Republic of Science” by emphasizing the way in which 
specialists in adjacent areas evaluated new findings. He tells us little about their 
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heuristics for doing so, though clearly his general ideas about professional 
standards are of the kind that has local variations and applications. More can be 
said.  
 The considerations Polanyi applies to science were also applied by him 
to the economics of planning, and this opens a related domain of inquiry.  
Peter Boettke argued in The Political Economy of Soviet Socialism that the idea of 
central planning was applied in earnest only for the first decade after the 
Russian Revolution (1990).  What emerged in its place was a collection of 
loosely related plans. The way the plans were collected and collated had little to 
do with the idea of central planning in the contemporary economics literature. 
The models of perfect knowledge that Oscar Lange (and even Frank Knight in 
response to Lange) had discussed when they examined the theoretical 
possibility of centralized socialist planning were completely unlike the actual 
process. Yet well into the 1940s, planning continued to be discussed in these 
theoretical terms, and the successes of the Soviet Union were taken to 
vindicate, in some sense, the theoretical possibility of a kind of virtual 
knowledge of demand. Polanyi himself pointed out that, although the planners 
got their knowledge in ways other than the open market, they were ways that 
were quite mundane. As David Prychitko notes,   
 
Polanyi argued that, as opposed to the theoretical model, the Soviet 
economy has been composed of numerous, conflicting planning 
centers—a “polycentric” as opposed to “monocentric” order. 
Coordination, to the extent that it occurred at all, took place not at the 
center of the planning hierarchy, but at the lower levels, among the 
individual enterprise managers who used their own discretionary 
authority and engaged in black market exchanges. Though the quantity 
and quality of outputs chosen and produced at the enterprise level 
became aggregated into a so-called central plan, and indeed were later 
published as a unified, centrally issued plan established by the directives 
of GOSPLAN (the Soviet central planning bureau), in fact the 
coordination of economic activities took place at the enterprise level, at 
the bottom of the hierarchy. (Prychitko 2002: 154n8) 
 
Managers engaged in black market operations knew what the values of goods 
were, whether there was demand, and so forth (cf.  Roberts 2005). These were 
imperfect means, but nevertheless means subject to real world discipline in the 
form of facts about prices. The managers used this information to plan their 
own production, and the planners aggregated these plans and tinkered with 
them. This was a system with its own epistemic biases, resulting in part from 
the limited knowledge of the contributing players. It was far from the ideal 
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rationalized central planning. Nevertheless, it was a system that aggregated 
knowledge of diverse kinds into a collective result.  
The most famous alternative to this form of centralized pseudo-planning 
in the “Socialist” countries was the decentralized Yugoslavian system of worker 
self-managed productive units, which operated with limited market 
mechanisms for resources, and more or less open markets for the consumer 
goods. As Prychitko showed in Marxism and Workers Self-management (1991), 
these units, which purported to solve the problem of alienation by giving the 
workers control of what happened to the products they made, transferred the 
problems of planning and making market related decisions to the workers, or 
rather to workers’ councils, which were supposed to be democratic, 
participatory, and  to produce a decentralized bottom up control of the 
economy that eliminated the waste of financial speculation and advertising. 
Democratic participation is a knowledge aggregation system. And 
comparing the scheme of aggregation of knowledge of an ordinary hierarchical 
firm to a democratically self-managed one, as Prychitko does, points out some 
interesting differences in how knowledge is shared. The workers had a greater 
propensity and incentive to share information about what was happening in 
their part of the production process, for example. But the workers were not 
especially willing to undertake the knowledge related tasks of aggregating this 
knowledge, or taking responsibility for decisions, problems that would be 
solved in an actual case of democratic rule by rewarding winners in political 
competition. This points to a whole range of questions about how propensities 
and abilities to use and share knowledge differ among organizations, and thus 
to the epistemic problem of what sort of different kinds of learners different 
organizations are, and what are the biases, efficiencies, and blind spots in the 
different “collective” information processing and aggregating heuristics that 
result from the way in which the organizations operate.  
  
Bilateral Asymmetric Consilience 
 
Fitting the pieces together is a metaphor, as is the term ‘network’. 
Polanyi doesn’t inquire into the epistemology of fitting together. What is the 
relevance of having the pieces fit, or having new knowledge in adjacent areas of 
science? Certainly it has some bearing on our sense that we are on the right 
track, that the previous steps leading up to the new knowledge were the correct 
ones, and so forth. This model suggests consilience of induction as both a 
ground for belief in “our piece” and the solution provided by the puzzle as a 
whole, but also suggests a model of collective outcomes of epistemic 
contributions that go beyond individual knowers. The “adjustments” which 
Polanyi stressed are also adjustments in what people believe and the weight 
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they give to beliefs.  
Other examples can be used to reveal the problematic results of 
interpretations of experiments which ignore the “social” cues on which we 
ordinarily and necessarily rely in coming to beliefs. It is nevertheless awkward 
to think epistemically about what fitting together might mean because the 
traditions of epistemology are individualist. To help this along, let me give an 
example of a non-individual epistemic notion. Here the (descriptive rather than 
normative) epistemological problem is to understand this kind of knowledge 
and to understand how we rely on our knowledge of others—the social 
aspect—and how we use our own knowledge to assimilate it to what others 
know.  
 Suppose that the doctor supplies a diagnosis that is based on your self-
reported symptoms, but that also predicts symptoms that you did not report 
because you did not think they were relevant, but can now recognize as part of 
the syndrome. The situation is one of asymmetric knowledge, but also of 
distributed knowledge: the patient knows something the doctor doesn’t as well 
as the reverse. They are different kinds of knowledge: the doctor supplies the 
means of fitting together without knowing in advance at least some fact that 
turns out to fit. This is consilience in the original Whewell sense of correctly 
predicting some novel fact that the theory was not constructed to account for 
(Whewell 1858: 88-90). In this case, the doctor was accounting for the 
symptoms that were presented. 
 This is different from reliabilism, also “social” and “epistemic” in a sense 
independent of judging testimony, yet which still reflects acceptance of the 
asymmetric knowledge of others. The basic thought is that the fact of 
consilience itself adds to the epistemic weight of the facts considered 
independently, in contrast to the aggregation and voting cases. The added 
weight is not something done by judging the expertise of the source, though 
this is part of the story. It is social because you don’t get the epistemic payoff, 
namely consilience, without the social, in this case the acceptance as minimally 
weighty of the fact and content of the beliefs of others, which are then 
combined with one’s own for the payoff. 
 In contrast, assessing testimony adds no epistemic weight, content, or 
predictive power to the original testimony—it is a subjective weighing of 
something else’s epistemic weight (or “probative force” —you can pick your 
favorite term). “Consilience” or what we might in this case call “Asymmetric 
Bilateral Consilience,” is more than merely consistency with the diagnosis, 
which is another, weaker sense, (which might be the case where a jury rejects 
testimony based on their own knowledge of relevant facts that are not 
consistent with the testimony, which we could call “Asymmetric Bilateral 
Consistency”). But maybe we could do the world a favor and not call them 
                                          STUDIES IN EMERGENT ORDER                                80 
 
anything fancy.    
 Like all heuristics, this one can go wrong, and typically “going wrong” 
means applying them under circumstances that don’t work for reasons the user 
does not know. The place that this heuristic most obviously can go wrong is 
when the novel fact predicted by the expert is not as independent of the facts 
known to the non-expert as one or the other might believe. This would occur, 
for example, when both expert and non-expert are describing facts in 
accordance with a common but unacknowledged ideology, as when the non-
expert reads an ideologically selective newspaper report and “discovers” that 
this fits an expert “truth” that is generated in a hidden way by the same 
ideology. The hypothesis of a hidden variable producing the facts, like the case 
of assumptions of independence in statistics, is normally one that is beyond the 
limits of the heuristic itself. And this raises questions about the way in which 
the heuristics we employ in assessing and giving weight to other people’s 
opinions, for example in the case of the problem described by Pettit of when to 
defer to majority opinion, are themselves potentially compromised. The 
heuristics are limited by our failure or inability to assess whether these opinions 
are indeed the result of more or less independent judgments of others, or are 
the product of a consensus produced artificially by some other means. This fits 
with the many social psychological experiments on conformity of the 1950s, to 
be discussed shortly, which showed how readily people would accept false 
beliefs if a group of which they were a part affirmed them. If the subjects of 
the experiments had known that there was a conspiracy by the members of the 
group to affirm these beliefs, or even, that they were not independently arrived 
at, they would have responded differently. In the case of the physician’s 
diagnosis, the same point holds: if one’s descriptions of one’s own symptoms 
are influenced by the same therapeutic ideology as the physician, the 
independence of the two acts of description, one motivated from and derived 
from the physicians diagnosis, the other from the private experience of the 
patient, is an illusion.  
 Polanyi’s puzzle model of science depends on giving epistemic weight to 
the beliefs of others, and “fitting” in some way with their beliefs. What is 
fitting, in an epistemic sense? This strong kind of consilience is one example of 
fitting. Collective rationality, extended mind, etc. models locate the knowing in 
the collective knower. Polanyi’s model doesn’t do that: it relies on the notion of 
networks. But it also allows for, and indeed forces us to begin, thinking about 
the kinds of heuristics, both individual and (actually) collective rather than 
merely social, that are in fact employed, and how they produce the double 
heuristic pattern.  Bilateral asymmetric consilience is a very strong source of 
epistemic weight. But it too makes some assumptions about independence: the 
scientific workers are supposed to be specialists working on their own little 
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patch of science and thus uninfluenced by what is going on in the parts of the 
network, or the puzzle, that they are not working on. And this is not the only 
form of fitting: there can be heuristics that work using weaker heuristics, such 
as deference to scientific authority as such and consciously fitting our 
observations and beliefs to whatever appears as the consensus. But of course 
these heuristics have their own weaknesses and biases.   
 
Information Poverty and Consensus 
 
As part of the training for American diplomats, they are shown a table of 
cutlery, with dozens of implements. Why? So they know how to use the right 
fork, and avoid a diplomatic gaffe. One could have expert knowledge of such 
things, but most of us, in the face of the problem of how to use a fork, use the 
simple heuristic “when in Rome, do as the Romans.” This is suggestive. Isn’t it 
normally right to accept what others believe, or to give it great weight? Isn’t it a 
significant problem for a believer in x that others reject x? Doesn’t this 
produce a potentially large explanatory burden?  
 Heuristics work in normal situations. This one would work as well, 
unless one were copying the wrong person. And here we have heuristics as 
well: the Castilians who, according to the apparently false legend, started lisping 
because King Phillip lisped were following a heuristic, and successive 
generations followed them based on their own heuristic of talking like their 
betters. Does this make sense as a normative rule? Of course not, in the sense 
of an abstract approach to ethical truth. But this is misleading, as are a large 
number of psychology experiments which come to mind in these cases.  
 Here are a few examples. Vance Packard, in the 1950s, gave the example 
of an umbrella for sale in a department store. At a low price, the umbrella failed 
to sell. The price was doubled, and it sold briskly. What is going on here 
epistemically? The question of whether an umbrella is any good is not one that 
we are ordinarily able to determine by looking at it. The heuristic that says “you 
get what you pay for” would lead you to think a cheaply priced umbrella was 
no good; a higher priced one would be good. Since this is the only information 
we have in this case, the rule misleads us.  
 The Asch conformity experiments involved subjects who were placed 
with a group of confederates who gave different measurements of a line. Asch 
wondered about the circumstances under which the subject would capitulate to 
the majority. He found that some people did, others were confused, and others 
were resistant. The findings were that if the confederates were unanimous, 
people conformed; if there were a few dissenters, or even an inconsistent 
dissenter, the rate of conformity dropped drastically. The Milgram experiments 
seemed to show a lot of conformity. But they can’t even be run again because 
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people would know what was going on. Subjects did question the experiment 
as it went on, but the experimenters were trained to fend the questions off.  
 The experiments are all about abnormal situations: settings are 
information poor, so that often the only added information is the beliefs of 
others; access to other opinions is manipulated; information costs are 
manipulated or high, so that only cheap information supports the outcome. So 
these are, from the point of view of normal heuristics, abnormal situations. 
They are useful only for revealing our normal heuristics. But they also show 
that one can create abnormal situations that allow these normal social heuristics 
to be used against people. The problem, as indicated in connection with 
bilateral asymmetric consilience, is that the heuristics themselves, by definition, 
do not detect the abnormality of the situation. And this is particularly 
important in relation to notions like consensus, which we know from these 
experiments to have powerful effects on people’s belief: assumptions about the 
independence of the parties to the consensus are false, and the environment is 
information poor. 
 
Expert Knowledge and Democracy 
 
We can think of the problems with which we began, the problem of 
expertise in liberal democracy, in terms relative to normal and abnormal 
heuristics rather than “truth.” Simple models of democracy assume that people 
have interests, knowledge of the basic functions of government and 
information on how they are being carried out, and a capacity to assess the 
interests and motives of others. They operate to advance their own interests, 
and make common cause with those who can articulate interests that coincide 
with theirs, or are not in too great a conflict with theirs, or match their vision 
of a harmonious, decent society. But the heuristics they employ, according to 
various bodies of research, involve getting information from trusted sources, 
such as local influentials, rather than making these assessments on their own. 
This is a heuristic: trust those who you know to be well-informed, responsible, 
and with a stake in the same things you have a stake in.  
“Influence,” however, is a crude term, which implies some sort of occult 
psychological force. Perhaps, in these cases, it should be understood 
epistemically, in the manner of the physician. If the influential says things that 
imply things that the hearer knows, it should help strengthen both of their 
beliefs. Even the weak epistemic support provided by the fact that the 
influential, who is similarly situated, has these beliefs is still epistemic rather 
than a matter of occult psychology. Nevertheless the reliance on influentials is a 
heuristic with obvious biases. Some of these, under normal circumstances, are 
beneficial. It provides an obvious protection against such classic evils of 
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democracy as demagoguery: if one is relying along with one’s friends on one’s 
local influentials, it is unlikely that waves of political enthusiasm for false 
prophets will overwhelm the system. At the same time, it is a heuristic that is 
relatively immune to totalitarian ideology: local influentials tend to think for 
themselves and not behave in a uniform manner. But it is also true that such a 
system is not especially receptive to assertions of expert authority that do not 
operate through trusted local influentials.  
Of course, all of this is a greatly simplified model even of traditional 
democracies. Modern democracies are composed of people with memberships 
in a variety of groups, which operate in ways that differ, and have their own 
heuristics. Because of the sheer variety of heuristics found in different groups, 
the possible combinations of them in a collective procedure are also large. The 
problem of designing a decision procedure that produces good results given the 
individual heuristics of the participants is daunting. But posing the question in 
terms of double heuristics does allow us to give these questions some content. 
What if it is claimed that liberal democracy, because of its open discussion, 
which fails to adequately defer to scientific consensus, needs to be abolished or 
corrected by policing utterances about science in order to save the world by 
enacting proper policies on climate change? These are translatable into 
questions about the joint operation of individual and collective heuristics, and 
pose questions that might be solved by altering collective decision procedures 
to produce heuristics with different biases.  
 We can ask the same kinds of critical questions about the double 
heuristics involved in the production of collective expert opinion out of 
individual expert heuristics. Does scientific groupthink and grant-driven 
bandwagoning make science unreliable as a source of the kinds of facts that 
political bodies need to make? What if Ulrich Beck was right to complain that 
experts had a conservative epistemic bias which led them to be skeptical about 
the evidence for risks, and to systematically under-rate risks, and we have a 
system for collective decision-making that defers to experts? (Beck 1995).  We 
magnify the error producing potential of the system in a specific direction. But 
if we have a system in which experts benefit by asserting risks, we have the 
opposite result. 
In the end it will be clear that there is no such thing as a perfect 
heuristic, that each has blind spots or biases. We can also see what the 
“normal” situations are in which the heuristics can be said to be the best, and 
ask whether the situation we are in is abnormal, and perhaps requires a 
differently designed decision procedure which implies a different collective 
heuristic. There is no general solution to the problem of whether the situation 
in which the heuristic is applied is normal. But that is not the point. We will at 
least have a vocabulary in which to ask these questions, and ask them about 
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historical cases which are similar, as well as to think about problems of 
institutional design. This is a failing of much present discussion of expertise 
and liberal democracy, which is concerned instead with the question of whether 
expertise is genuine.   
And it is a failing of social epistemology to ignore the epistemic 
dimension of “the social,” the fact that much of the content of our social 
relations with others involves epistemic weightings—indeed, it is hard to see 
anything in our social relations that does not involve changes in the weighting 
of our own beliefs on the basis of the actions and beliefs of others. Thinking in 
terms of double heuristics compels us to think about collective decision 
procedures in terms of the same problems of bias, selectivity, and so forth that 
characterize the individual knowledge related activities of which collective 
activity is composed.  
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